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THE “ULTIMATE” QUESTION: ARE ULTIMATE
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS REQUIRED TO SUCCEED ON A
DISCRIMINATION CLAIM UNDER SECTION 703(A) OF
TITLE VII?
Yina Cabrera*
ABSTRACT
To make a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, courts
apply the paradigm set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. The
plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was
qualified for the job; and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action;
and that (4) the employer gave better treatment to a similarly situated person
outside the plaintiff’s protected class. In prong three, the term “adverse
employment action” is introduced as a requirement. Title VII outlines several
examples of adverse employment actions, which may include termination,
demotion with significantly less pay, etc.
In Burlington Northern v. White, the Court explained that Section 703,
Title VII’s substantive anti-discrimination provision, sets out to prevent
injury to employees for “who they are” and prevent harms within the scope
of employment and the workforce. Burlington further distinguished Section
703 from Section 704, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, stating that
Congress intended for the retaliation statute to be broader in order to
encompass retaliatory conduct taken by employers against employees not
directly tied to their employment or for harms caused outside the workplace.
However, this left a gray area for discriminatory actions taken by employers
within the scope of employment but that are not necessarily reflected in an
ultimate employment decision, such as a firing, failure to hire, or a demotion
with a change in pay.
In February of 2019, Peterson v. Linear Controls Inc. was decided.
Here, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that there was no
materially adverse action where black employees were subject to working
outside in the heat without access to water, while white employees remained
inside in the air conditioning with access to water. The court reasoned that
because the employees did not suffer an “ultimate employment decision”
such as a discharge or change in compensation, the differences in their
employment conditions were not actionable under Title VII. Other circuits,

*
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however, reason that adverse employment actions include conduct that is
reasonably likely to impair a reasonable employee’s job performance or
prospects for advancement or promotion, essentially ridding the term of the
requirement that an ultimate employment decision be taken in order for a
disparate treatment claim to be actionable.
Thus, given the varying interpretations to the adverse employment
action requirement, the Supreme Court should expand its holding in
Burlington, where it stated that “ultimate employment decisions” are not
required for retaliation claims, to encompass disparate treatment cases. This
would ultimately allow claims to prevail without an absolute showing of a
failure to hire, failure to grant leave, a discharge, a failure to promote, or a
decrease in compensation. Rather, moving forward, Title VII should stand
true to its very words and prohibit a more extensive range of employer
practices that may affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
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INTRODUCTION

At the moment, we are witnessing a system in which employers may
subject black employees to drastically different work environments than they
do white employees and still prevail at trial if no “ultimate employment
decision” was taken against the black employees.1 For instance, employers
can get away with placing black employees outside in the heat, with no water
access, while allowing white employees to remain working inside with air
conditioning and water, so long as both groups are completing the same job
duties with the same pay.2 If the black employees choose to bring a disparate
treatment claim against their employer, depending on what circuit they bring

1
2

See Peterson v. Linear Controls Inc., 757 F. App’x. 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id.
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their claim in, they may not prevail because no “ultimate employment
decision,” such as a firing, demotion, or a transfer with significantly fewer
duties, was taken.3 This ignores the fact that most discrimination in the
workplace today is subtle or masked in discrete forms, rather than the explicit
discrimination that Title VII first sought to correct. Consequently, employers
may circumvent liability by subjecting employees of protected classes to
harsher working conditions without necessarily taking an “ultimate
employment action.” This has been evidenced by the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in Peterson v. Linear Controls, decided in February of 2019, where this exact
scenario took place.4 The petitioner from Peterson asked the Supreme Court
to decide whether the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
covered by Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are
limited only to hiring, firing, promotions, compensation, and leave.5
Lamentably, in July 2020, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for writ
of certiorari after the petitioner, Peterson himself, moved to dismiss the case
under Supreme Court Rule 46.6 Had the case not been dismissed, the
Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to ultimately decide this
pressing issue. If given a similar opportunity in the near future, the Supreme
Court should find that the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
covered by Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are
not limited only to hiring, firing, promotions, compensation, and leave.
Currently, courts remain split on their interpretations of the “adverse
employment action” requirement to establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment. While several courts follow the premise that a wide array of
disadvantageous changes in the workplace can constitute adverse
employment actions,7 other courts, like the Fifth and Third Circuits, strongly
disagree, interpreting Title VII’s substantive prohibition on discrimination to
reach only “ultimate employment decisions.”8 Such ultimate employment
decisions encompass only hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or
compensating.9 The Supreme Court in Burlington Northern made it clear that
courts could not apply an “ultimate employment decision” requirement for
retaliation cases, stating that Congress intended for the retaliation provision
to remain broader in order to encompass retaliatory conduct outside of the

3

Id.
Id.
5 Id.
6 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Revised Mot. to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 46, Peterson v. Linear
Controls, Inc., No. 18-1401 (5th Cir. 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/181401/147114/20200707133208845_Revised%20Rule%2046%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss.pdf.
7 Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).
8 See generally Peterson, 757 F. App’x. at 373.
9 McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2007).
4
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workplace.10 However, the Court did not expand this holding to encompass
disparate treatment cases in which adverse employment actions are taken
within the workplace but may not necessarily appear as a tangible or ultimate
employment decision. As a result, the Court has left the interpretation of
“adverse employment actions” and what constitutes the “terms and
conditions” in relation to those adverse actions up to each circuit.
The Court should take the next possible opportunity, using cases similar
to Peterson, to clarify what kinds of employer actions may be considered
adverse, and expand the “adverse employment action” requirement to
encompass a wide array of disadvantageous changes in the workplace, rather
than limit it to ultimate employment decisions. In Burlington, the Court went
as far as to say that, as a practical matter, not all adverse actions are
necessarily employment related.11 It differentiated between Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision, which prohibits discrimination as to “terms and
conditions of employment,” and Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, which
prohibits “discrimination” but is not limited by the additional phrase “terms
and conditions of employment.”12
However, there remains a stringent burden on Title VII plaintiffs
bringing substantive disparate treatment claims. Using the same logic in
Burlington, the harmfulness of each adverse employment action should be an
objective standard that would examine whether a “reasonable employee”
would view the harm as significant, since only significant, as opposed to
“trivial” harms, are actionable.13 This way, the context of the alleged adverse
action must be considered on a case-by-case basis and not automatically
dismissed if there is no evidence of an ultimate employment decision.14
Part II of this Comment provides background information regarding
Title VII, its purpose, and the ways in which it has expanded to meet the
needs of our changing society. This particular section analyzes the fact that
Title VII was created to halt the racial discrimination and segregation that
was pervasive in our nation, and still exists today in many, and newer, forms.
Afterward, Part II goes on to explain the “adverse employment action”
requirement in Title VII when establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment. Here, the circuit split is introduced. Part III will discuss Peterson
in more depth, as well as elaborate on the circuit split in more detail,
organized by approach. Part IV briefly explains why cases like Peterson
present the ideal facts for the Supreme Court to resolve the question of
whether it is necessary to show an “ultimate employment decision” when
10

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See id.
11
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establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Afterward, Part V of this
Comment analyzes how the Supreme Court should rule when faced with this
question presented.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Emergence and Expansion of Title VII
Since Reconstruction, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the
first significant civil rights act to come into effect. Title VII was created
during a time of urgency and unrest, in which racial discrimination and
segregation were pervasive in our nation. Title VII makes it unlawful to (1)
“fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee,15 because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”16 Title VII applies to employers
in both the private and public sectors that have fifteen or more employees, as
well as to the federal government, employment agencies, and labor
organizations.17
In 1991, amendments to Title VII authorized claims for damages and
jury trials.18 As a result, employers had no other choice but to abide by this
legislation, completely changing the face of the American workplace. Since
1991, Title VII has seen many improvements, encompassing discrimination
that the authors of Title VII did not originally anticipate the need to include.
But just as the original authors of Title VII did not anticipate the need to
15

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000).
The term “employee” means an individual employed by an employer, except that the
term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or
political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen
by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy
making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional
or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall
not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government,
governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a
foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2020).
17 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/employment/employmentdiscrimination/title-vii/ (last updated Apr. 2018).
18 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Nov. 21, 1991),
https://www.eeoc.gov/civil-rights-act-1991-original-text.
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include protections for discrimination based on things like disability status,
pregnancy, or sexual orientation, other groups of individuals with new,
particularized issues have emerged; the need for Title VII to adapt as
discrimination in the workplace changes its form is crucial to achieving
exactly what it seeks to protect: a workplace where individuals are not
discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or genderbased status.19 As overt discrimination has become less common,
unconscious bias20 has grown more prominent amongst employers, and the
need for clarity on these modern issues is critical.
Further, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also created the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a federal agency that
enforces the laws against job discrimination and harassment. Today, the
EEOC processes about 80,000 job discrimination complaints and works with
about 94 state and local agencies that investigate approximately 50,000
additional job discrimination complaints.21 One vital function of the EEOC
is to issue “EEOC Guidance” documents. While these guidance documents
are not binding law, they should be looked upon for clarity concerning the
law or EEOC policies.22 As discrimination in the workforce has grown
subtler, the EEOC’s role in clarifying these policies is as important as ever.
Within these guidelines, the EEOC has in fact included how the “adverse
action” requirement should generally be interpreted, stating
The most obvious types of adverse actions are denial of
promotion, refusal to hire, denial of job benefits, demotion,
suspension, and discharge.23 Other types of adverse actions
may include work-related threats,24 warnings, reprimands,25
transfers,26 negative or lowered evaluations,27 transfers to
less prestigious or desirable work or work locations.28

19

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973).
See Valerie Martinelli, The Truth About Unconscious Bias in the Workplace, TALENT CULTURE
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://talentculture.com/the-truth-about-unconscious-bias-in-the-workplace/.
21 What
Is
the
EEOC?,
U.S.
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/youth/aboutwho.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
22 EEOC
Guidance,
U.S.
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
https://www1.eeoc.gov/guidance/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
23 Roberts v. Roadway Express, 149 F.3d 1098, 1104 (10th Cir. 1998).
24 Planadeball v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 793 F.3d 169 (1st Cir. 2015).
25 Millea v. Metro-North R.R., 658 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2011).
26 Kessler v. Westchester Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 209 (2d Cir. 2006).
27 See, e.g., Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
28 EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidanceretaliation-and-related-issues.
20
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However, each circuit has still interpreted Title VII’s adverse employment
action requirement for disparate treatment cases drastically differently. This
presents a newfound need for more straightforward guidance from the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court should grab at the next opportunity to
further expand Title VII to encompass those it is meant to protect but have
been overlooked: employees bringing disparate treatment claims that cannot
necessarily point to an “ultimate employment decision.”
B. Adverse Employment Actions
In order for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of discrimination,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has suffered an adverse
employment action.29 The dividing line between actionable and nonactionable conduct—for claims of both retaliation or status-based
discrimination—concerns the presence, or absence, of an adverse
employment action.30 To make a prima facie case of disparate treatment
discrimination, the courts apply the paradigm set forth in McDonnell
Douglas. The plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) belongs to a protected
class; (2) was qualified for the job; and (3) was subjected to an adverse
employment action; and (4) that the employer gave better treatment to a
similarly-situated person outside the plaintiff’s protected class.31 This
adverse employment action outlined in the third prong must be something
more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or alteration of job
responsibilities.32 Examples of adverse employment actions may include
termination, demotion with significantly less pay, etc.
As briefly explained earlier, the adverse employment action requirement
has been interpreted differently in Title VII’s substantive discrimination
provision, Section 703,33 and its retaliation provision, Section 704.34 In the
retaliation context, for instance, the definition of adverse employment action
is explicitly not limited to discriminatory acts that affect the terms and
conditions of employment, but rather it covers harms that well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
29 See Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008); Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451
F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2006); Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2005); Villiarimo v.
Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002); Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, 82 F.3d 578,
580 (3d Cir. 1996).
30 MJPOSPIS, What Is an “Adverse Employment Action?”, POSPIS LAW PLLC (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://pospislaw.com/blog/2016/09/06/what-is-an-adverse-employment-action/.
31 See Davis, 520 F.3d at 1089; Demoret, 451 F.3d at 151; Farrell, 421 F.3d at 613; Villiarimo,
281 F.3d at 1062; Geraci, 82 F.3d at 580.
32 Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2020).
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
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discrimination.35 This distinction took place after the Supreme Court case
Burlington Northern v. White.36 In Burlington, the Court focused on the
linguistic difference between Section 703(a) and Section 704(a), stating that
the underscored words in 703(a)— “hire,” “discharge,” “compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” “employment
opportunities,” and “status as an employee”— “explicitly limited the scope
of that provision to actions that affected employment or altered the conditions
of the workplace.”37 The Burlington Court stated that because Congress rid
the retaliation provision of these words, Congress intended to encompass
adverse actions not directly related to a plaintiff’s employment, as well as
harms caused outside the workplace, for retaliation claims.38
However, while the Supreme Court in Burlington correctly expanded
Title VII’s reach regarding retaliation claims, it did not necessarily limit the
disparate treatment claims that can be brought, like many circuits seem to
believe it has. In other words, yes, Burlington stated that Title VII’s
substantive discrimination provision is limited to employer actions that affect
employment or alter the conditions of the workplace; however, nowhere in
Burlington’s holding does the Court limit disparate treatment claims to only
“ultimate employment decisions.” Rather, the Burlington Court merely
recognized that the Courts of Appeals have treated discrimination claims in
this rigid way and held that retaliation claims should not be treated alike
because a provision limiting employment-related actions would not deter the
“many forms that effective retaliation can take.”39 This, however, has left the
circuits without guidance and has created a circuit split regarding what
exactly constitutes an “adverse employment action” for substantive
discrimination claims.
Some circuits claim to construe the meaning strictly, while others
construe the term more loosely. For example, in Nakis v. Potter, the court
explained that there are no bright-line rules for determining which
employment actions meet the “adverse” threshold.40 There, for example, the
court held that the denial of plaintiff’s request to retake an Excel class was
sufficiently “adverse” for plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim, since it
appeared to “bear on plaintiff’s opportunities for professional growth and

35 See Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008); Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451
F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2006); Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2005); Villiarimo v.
Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002); Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, 82 F.3d 578,
580 (3d Cir. 1996).
36 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 63.
39 Id. at 64.
40 Nakis v. Potter, 422 F. Supp. 2d 398, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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career advancement.”41 In that case then, the court did not require that an
“ultimate employment decision” be taken against the plaintiff. Several
circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, follow this interpretation of an adverse
employment action. For instance, the Judicial Council of California Civil
Jury Instructions (2017 edition) outline an adverse employment action as
follows:
Adverse employment actions are not limited to ultimate
actions such as termination or demotion. There is an adverse
employment action if [name of defendant] has taken an
action or engaged in a course or pattern of conduct that,
taken as a whole, materially and adversely affected the
terms, conditions, or privileges of [name of plaintiff]’s
employment. An adverse employment action includes
conduct that is reasonably likely to impair a reasonable
employee’s job performance or prospects for advancement
or promotion. However, minor or trivial actions or conduct
that is not reasonably likely to do more than anger or upset
an employee cannot constitute an adverse employment
action.42
Other circuits, however, greatly disagree with the court in Nakis and with the
Ninth Circuit.43 The Fifth Circuit, for example, stresses the need for an
employer to take such an “ultimate employment decision” in order for the
plaintiff to have an actionable claim of discrimination. These circuits claim
to take a stricter approach, encompassing only hiring, granting leave,
discharging, promoting, or compensating into their “ultimate employment
decision” requirement.44

III. PETERSON V. LINEAR AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Requiring an Ultimate Employment Decision
The Fifth Circuit’s decisions have consistently limited what counts as
an “ultimate” decision to only “hiring, granting leave, discharging,

41

Id.
JUDICIAL
COUNCIL
OF
CALIFORNIA
CIVIL
JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
(2017),
https://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/Judicial_Council_of_California_Civil_Jury_Instructions.
pdf.
43 Id.
44 McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007).
42
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promoting, or compensating.”45 In February of 2019, the Fifth Circuit in
Peterson v. Linear Controls Inc. stated that the court would construe an
adverse employment action more “strictly” by looking to see if an “ultimate
employment decision” was taken. The Fifth Circuit in Peterson ruled that
where black employees’ job duties were changed to working outside in the
Louisiana summer heat without access to water, while their white
counterparts remained inside in the air conditioning, this did not constitute
an adverse employment action.46 The court reasoned that because the
employees did not suffer an “ultimate employment decision” such as
discharge or change in compensation, their differences in work environments
were not actionable under Title VII.47
Recently, the plaintiff in the Peterson case petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari, asking the Court:
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual” with respect to “compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of
the individual’s race, religion, sex, or other protected status.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Are the “terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment” covered by Section 703(a)(1)
limited only to hiring, firing, promotions, compensation, and
leave?48
In Peterson, the plaintiff, Mr. Peterson, alleged that even after the black
employees requested to their white supervisors that they rotate from outside
to inside among the white and black employees, no action was taken.49
Further, when black employees attempted to take breaks indoors, including
indoor water breaks, they were “cursed and yelled at” and ordered back to
work.50 As a result, Mr. Peterson quit his job and filed a charge with the
EEOC for employment discrimination.51 Ultimately, Mr. Peterson filed suit,
and the court held that Mr. Peterson’s race discrimination claim failed “as a
matter of law” because he had not alleged “any” employment practice that
violated Title VII.52 The district court noted that binding authority from the

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id.
Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., 757 F. App’x 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 374.
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Fifth Circuit took a “narrow view” of what constitutes prohibited
discrimination under Section 703(a), explaining that prohibited
discrimination included only ultimate employment actions such as hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating. On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.53
Section 703(a) prohibits discrimination as to the “terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.”54 The Fifth Circuit, however, stated that while
the events were “disturbing,” the working conditions that the petitioner was
subjected to were not against the statute.55 Rather, had the petitioner been
discharged, denied leave or promotion, or paid differently than his white
counterparts, only then would he have had an actionable claim under Title
VII in the Fifth Circuit.
Similar to the case at bar, the Fifth Circuit has also held that a race
discrimination claim cannot survive where a black applicant was subject to
drug testing after a workplace incident, unlike his white counterpart after a
similar incident.56 The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning was that simply being
subjected to a drug test, without more, would not constitute an “ultimate
employment decision” because a drug test does not affect an employee’s
duties, compensation, or benefits.57 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit has rejected
race discrimination claims in which black employees alleged to have been
subjected to heavier workloads while being denied assistance when
compared to their counterparts.58 Again, applying its rigid “ultimate
employment decision,” the Fifth Circuit held that imposing heavier
workloads that other employees were not subjected to cannot constitute an
adverse employment action under Title VII.59
Cases such as Peterson and the rest of the aforementioned Fifth Circuit
holdings should make one consider the questions: Is this what the substantive
discrimination provision of Title VII was created to accomplish? Could a
civil rights act specifically aimed at preventing workplace discrimination
seek to maintain such a narrow scope, aimed only at remedying “ultimate
employment actions”? And, is it truly inconceivable that Section 703(a)
reaches beyond these tangible forms of discrimination to encompass the form

53

Id. at 376.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2019).
55 Peterson, 757 F. App’x at 375.
56 Johnson v. Manpower Prof’l Servs., Inc., 442 F. App’x 977, 983 (5th Cir. 2011).
57 Id.
58 See Wesley v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2266-D, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101476, at
*6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2008); Ellis v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 426 F. App’x 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2011);
see also Benningfield v. City of Hous., 157 F.3d 369, 376–77 (5th Cir. 1998).
59 See Wesley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101476, at *6; Ellis, 426 F. App’x at 296.
54
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of discrimination we see most of in today’s age: differential treatment
masked behind what deceivingly appears as equal footing?
In its attempt at better refining what constitutes an adverse employment
action, the Third Circuit asks whether a particular discriminatory act is
“serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.”60 The Third Circuit has heard a
case almost identical to Peterson, in which a black employee failed to make
a prima facie case of race discrimination. In the Third Circuit, a black
employee brought suit claiming that he was required by his employer to work
outdoors, regardless of the dangerously high temperatures.61 Quite similarly
to Peterson, the white counterparts in this Third Circuit case were allowed to
stop their outdoor work while the black employees continued.62 There, the
Third Circuit held that the plaintiff did not make out a prima facie case of
race discrimination because the employer had not acted with respect to the
plaintiff’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”63
The Third Circuit even went on to include in its decision that while the court
did not “doubt Harris’s characterizations of the conditions outside” nor did
they “minimize the seriousness of any injury that Harris incurred,” they
nevertheless could not conclude that the plaintiff showed an adverse
employment action and thus failed to make out a prima facie case of race
discrimination.64
The very problem lies in the fact that courts are able to do away with
these cases with such ease. A court should not be able to recognize the gravity
of the injury caused on the one hand yet dismiss the claim because a plaintiff
cannot point to something as tangible, or “ultimate,” as a firing or change in
pay. Rather, these instances of differential treatment should be analyzed as
themselves being changes in “employment terms and conditions,” which
Title VII explicitly allows for. We cannot expect to rid the workplace of all
forms of discrimination if we do not treat differential treatment that lacks an
“ultimate employment decision” with the same attention and skepticism that
we do when we see a demotion with a change in pay, a firing, or an
undesirable transfer.

60 Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh,
120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)).
61 Harris v. AG United States, 687 F. App’x 167, 168 (3d Cir. 2017).
62 Id. at 168–69.
63 Id. at 169 (quoting Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004)).
64 Id. at 169.
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B. Rejecting the Stringent “Ultimate Employment Decision”
Requirement
The great majority of the circuits, including the Second, Sixth, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, have rejected the strict approach that
requires a plaintiff to show that an employer took an ultimate employment
decision in order to prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim. Instead, these
circuits recognize that there are a number of disadvantageous changes that
can occur in the workplace that can constitute adverse employment actions.
The Second Circuit has previously stated that “courts must pore over
each case to determine whether the challenged employment action reaches
the level of ‘adverse’” because there is no “bright-line rule.”65 Take, for
instance, the scenario described earlier in which an employee complains that
he is unfairly overworked in comparison to his counterparts.66 The rigid
standard utilized in Peterson, or in the Fifth and Third Circuits generally,
does not allow for a system that recognizes an unfair distribution of work as
adverse treatment simply because the work is a part of the employees’ “job
duties” or job description.67 In fact, the defendants in Peterson explicitly
argued that Mr. Peterson’s allegations did not implicate the “terms,
conditions, or privileges” of his employment because working outdoors was
part of his job description.68 The Second Circuit, however, has rejected these
inflexible standards, holding that “performance of normal job duties can
amount to an adverse employment action if they are divvied between coworkers in a discriminatory fashion.”69 The Second Circuit has explained that
a “[d]isproportionately heavy workload could perhaps be an adverse action,
if the additional work significantly changed the employee’s responsibilities
so as to diminish that worker’s role or status, or exposed the worker to
dangerous or extreme conditions not appropriate to her job classification.”70
In these previous holdings, the Second Circuit has referred to the showing of
an adverse action in order to make a prima facie case of discrimination as a
“low threshold.”71

65

Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir. 1997).
See Wesley v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2266-D, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101476, at
*6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2008); Ellis v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 426 F. App’x 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2011);
see also Benningfield v. City of Hous., 157 F.3d 369, 376–77 (5th Cir. 1998).
67 Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., 757 F. App’x 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2019).
68 Id.
69 Lopez v. Flight Servs. & Sys., 881 F. Supp. 2d 431, 441 (W.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Young v.
Rogers & Wells LLP, No. 00-Civ-8019(GEL), 2002 WL 31496205, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 06, 2002).
70 Young, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21541, at *5.
71 Id.
66
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Likewise, the Sixth Circuit is not concerned with whether an employer
has taken an ultimate employment decision, such as a firing.72 The Sixth
Circuit has explained that while Burlington’s holding went great lengths to
distinguish Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision with its retaliation
provision, it did not alter the Sixth Circuit’s initial understanding of the
adverse employment action requirement in Section 703.73 The Sixth Circuit
has defined an adverse employment action:
[A] materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of
employment must be more disruptive than a mere
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. A
materially adverse change might be indicated by a
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a
decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a
material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a
particular situation.74
The Sixth Circuit fully rejects the notion that only ultimate employment
decisions can be materially adverse, both for the purposes of retaliation
claims as well as discrimination claims,75 expanding its reach to allow for
unique and particular situations to be heard,76 rather than quickly discarded
at summary judgment.
The Seventh Circuit has divided the kinds of cases in which adverse
employment actions appear into three groups:
1. Cases in which the employee’s compensation . . . benefits,
or other financial terms of employment are diminished,
including . . . termination of employment.77
2. Cases in which a nominally lateral transfer with no change
in financial terms significantly reduces the employee’s
career prospects by preventing him from using the skills in
which he is trained and experienced, so that the skills are
likely to atrophy, and his career is likely to be stunted.78
3. Cases in which the employee is not moved to a different
job or the skill requirements of his present job altered, but
the conditions in which he works are changed in a way that
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id.
Ford v. GMC, 305 F.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir. 2002).
Michael, 496 F.3d at 594; Ford, 305 F.3d at 553.
Ford, 305 F.3d at 53.
See, e.g., Simpson v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc. 196 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1999).
See, e.g., Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456–57 (7th Cir. 1994).
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subjects him to a humiliating, degrading, unsafe,
unhealthful, or otherwise significantly negative alteration in
his workplace environment—an alteration that can fairly be
characterized as objectively creating a hardship, the classic
case being that of the employee whose desk is moved into a
closet.79
The third category of cases identified by the Seventh Circuit allows for an
employee, like the plaintiff in Peterson, to bring a discrimination claim
against their employer when they are being subjected to unsafe, or otherwise
negative, conditions in their workplace,80 without having to necessarily face
a tangible change in the status of their job. This approach focuses on the
conditions of the workplace that the employee in a protected class is being
subjected to when compared to the rest of the employees not in that protected
class. In 2004, the Seventh Circuit held that a group of black employees
suffered an adverse employment action when their employer changed their
job assignments to working outdoors for the majority of their time.81 The
court specified that the plaintiffs were subjected to harsher working
conditions, which was in fact an adverse employment action.82
The Eighth83 and Ninth Circuits follow the same line of reasoning and
reject the Fifth and Third Circuits’ holdings. The Ninth Circuit, in reference
to the Supreme Court case of Oncale, has elaborated on the fact that Title VII
reaches beyond “terms and conditions” in the contractual sense and “evinces
a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
. . . in employment.”84 Most memorably, the Ninth Circuit has compared the
requirement of showing an ultimate employment decision to that of the
rationale behind “separate but equal.”85 The Ninth Circuit brought this
comparison in 2011, when the court found that a group of black employees
did in fact establish an adverse action when they were assigned to different
workplaces than their white counterparts.86 The Ninth Circuit stated that the
defendants’ contention that “segregation, without more, does not constitute
an adverse employment action” is “reminiscent of a ‘separate but equal’

79

Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id.
81 Tart v. Ill. Power Co., 366 F.3d 461, 475 (7th Cir. 2004).
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Wedow v. City of Kan. City, 442 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2006).
84 Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998)).
85 DeWeese v. Cascade Gen. Shipyard, Civil No. 08-860-JE, 2011 WL 3298421, at *10–*11 (D.
Or. May 9, 2011).
86 Id.
80
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model of racial equality that federal courts have long rejected.”87 Under the
Ninth Circuit’s broader standard, “a wide array of disadvantageous changes
in the workplace [may] constitute adverse employment actions.”88
Essentially, under this approach, an employer cannot escape liability by
masking a segregated workplace behind what deceptively looks like equal
job opportunities. In other words, an employer may be paying all employees
equally and assigning the same kinds of tasks, but at the same time, that
employer could exclusively subject a group of minority employees to harsher
working conditions, like those in Peterson, while allowing members outside
of that protected class to work in bearable conditions. The Ninth Circuit’s
expansive approach saves itself from falling into a system that cannot fathom
that this sort of discrimination exists and has permeated today’s workplace.
Under this same kind of expansive approach, the Tenth89 and Eleventh
Circuits have avoided adopting a stringent rule, opting to examine “the
unique factors relevant to the situation at hand.”90 The Eleventh Circuit has
stated, for instance, that reassigning employees to new job duties, regardless
of whether the change still remained a part of the job’s description, would in
fact constitute an actionable claim for discrimination if the plaintiff could
show that the job reassignment constituted a loss of prestige and
responsibility.91
C. The Undecided
The remaining circuits have not taken sides on the circuit split and have
not adopted their own uniform system for interpreting adverse employment
actions. The Fourth Circuit, however, has found that reducing a current
employee’s voluntary overtime opportunities, regardless of whether there
was a reduction in overall income, could be considered an adverse
employment action.92 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not rule on whether
every situation involving a reduction in voluntary overtime would be an
adverse employment action, but rather, it is up for a jury to decide.93
87

Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); Delacruz v. Tripler Army Med., 507 F.
Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (D. Haw. 2007); Lewis v. UPS, No. C 05-02820 WHA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23488, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2005).
89 Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998); Barone v. United Airlines,
Inc., 355 F. App’x 169, 181 (10th Cir. 2009).
90 See Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532; Barone, 355 Fed. Appx. at 181; Hinson v. Clinch Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 830 (11th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Dekalb Cty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.
1998).
91 See Doe, 145 F.3d at 1448; Hinson, 231 F.3d at 830.
92 See e.g., Ray v. Int’l Paper Co., 909 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2018).
93 Id.
88
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Lastly, when deciding cases involving lateral transfers, the D.C. Circuit
has stuck to the idea that a lateral transfer is not an adverse employment
action where it does not result in material changes in the “terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment.”94 However, the D.C. Circuit has opined that
where the purpose of the transfer would be to escape a racially-biased
supervisor who could negatively impact the employee’s career advancement,
such transfer would represent a change in the “terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment.”95
Interestingly enough, Justice Kavanaugh, then a D.C. Circuit judge,
gave a particularly pro-employee concurring opinion in the case of OrtizDiaz.96 In Ortiz, the court found that discriminatory transfers are sometimes
actionable, including under the circumstances alleged in this specific case
involving a racially biased supervisor. Judge Kavanaugh, however, wrote in
his concurring opinion:
Uncertainty will remain about the line separating transfers
actionable under Title VII from those that are not actionable.
In my view, the en banc Court at some point should go
further and definitely establish the following clear principle:
All discriminatory transfers (and discriminatory denials of
requested transfers) are actionable under Title VII. As I see
it, transferring an employee because of the employee’s race
(or denying an employee’s requested transfer because of the
employee’s race) plainly constitutes discrimination with
respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” in violation of Title VII.97
Although characterized as a conservative judge, here, Kavanaugh
expressed a view many would hold as pro-employee. This observation sparks
a new thought: how would, and of course, how should the Supreme Court
rule on this issue, given the nature of the current bench? Primarily, three of
the Supreme Court justices are currently classified as “left-leaning,” which
typically hold a pro-employee ideology. However, given Justice
Kavanaugh’s strong stance on employee transfers, it is possible that future
plaintiffs who find themselves in a position similar to Peterson could succeed
on a racial discrimination claim, using the right arguments.

94 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-1 (excluding Pub. L. No. 116283 and 116-315)).
95 Ortiz-Diaz v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Office of Inspector Gen., 867 F.3d
70, 81 (2016).
96 Id.
97 Id.
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IV. IT IS TIME TO DECIDE THIS ISSUE
Currently, the Supreme Court has ruled on what constitutes an “adverse
employment action” in the context of retaliatory discrimination.98 In
Burlington Northern, the plaintiff brought charges against her employer for
assigning her to less desirable duties after she complained of sexual
harassment.99 The lower court found that this did not constitute an adverse
employment action for purposes of Title VII because she was not fired,
demoted, denied a promotion, or denied wages.100 When brought before the
Supreme Court, the Court found that though the duties were within the same
classification and the pay was eventually reinstated, the action was
nevertheless sufficiently harsh to constitute retaliatory discrimination.101
After Burlington Northern, it was made clear that courts could not apply an
“ultimate employment decision” requirement to retaliation cases.102 The
Supreme Court, however, has failed to give clearer guidance on the meaning
of “adverse employment actions” when it comes to disparate treatment cases
or when it comes to analyzing discriminatory acts generally. The varying
interpretations of each circuit illustrate the drastic need for a more concrete
understanding.
The Supreme Court, on October 19, 2019, invited the Solicitor General
to file a brief in the Peterson case to express the views of the United States.103
Oftentimes, this is an indication that the Court is interested in hearing the
case.104 In fact, studies have indicated a petition is over thirty-seven times
more likely to be granted following a call for the views of the Solicitor
General.105 As of March 20, 2020,106 the Solicitor General filed his brief in
which he indicated that the Court should grant certiorari in the Peterson case
because the United States has a substantial interest in the Court’s resolution
of the question presented.107 The Solicitor General went on to fortify that the
Fifth Circuit was incorrect in holding that Section 703(a)(1) prohibits
98

See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
Id. at 58.
100 Id. at 59.
101 Id. at 71.
102 Id. at 67.
103 Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., SCOTUS BLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/peterson-v-linear-controls-inc/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
104 David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court
Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General,
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 273 (2009).
105 Id.
106 Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., supra note 103.
107 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., 757 F. App’x 370,
373 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1401).
99
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discrimination only in “ultimate employment decisions,” stating that this
requirement has no foundation in Title VII’s text, Congress’s purpose, or the
Court’s precedents.108
According to EEOC statistics, between the years 2010 and 2019, the
EEOC had received between 15,000 and 19,000 Title VII charges alleging
discrimination as to the terms or conditions of employment;109 this represents
more than a quarter of Title VII cases the EEOC receives in a fiscal year. 110
Proper guidance from the Court regarding the interpretation of Section 703(a)
would thus greatly impact employment discrimination litigation, as this is a
recurring issue in Title VII claims.111
Peterson had presented itself as the ideal case to settle the proper
interpretation of Section 703 and whether it prohibits discrimination only in
ultimate employment decisions. As the Solicitor General describes Peterson,
“the facts alleged here present the kind of extreme scenario that would
typically arise only as a hypothetical to illustrate the flaws in respondent’s
interpretation of the statute.”112 Unfortunately for anti-discrimination
plaintiffs, in July 2020, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for writ of
certiorari after the petitioner, Peterson himself, moved to dismiss the case.
Without the Court’s guidance, many plaintiffs who find themselves in a
circuit that takes the restrictive approach of requiring an ultimate
employment action will be continuously deterred from filing cases; attorneys
in these circuits are unlikely to pursue cases unless there is an automatic
showing of an ultimate employment decision. Surely, the Supreme Court has
a pressing interest in protecting Title VII’s foundational goals and Congress’s
intent in enacting the legislation; the Court’s interest calls for a need to act
with urgency in order to prevent discrimination plaintiffs with valid
segregation claims to be disposed of at summary judgment. Therefore, if
given a similar opportunity in the near future, the Supreme Court should jump
at such an opportunity in order to provide guidance to lower courts.
V.

HOW SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT RULE?

The Supreme Court should find that the “terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment” covered by Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
108

Id. at 6.
Statutes by Issue (Charges filed with EEOC), FY 2010 −FY 2019, EEOC,
https://go.usa.gov/xdBBu (last visited June 22, 2021).
110 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges (Charges filed with EEOC), FY 1997–FY
2019, EEOC, https:// go.usa.gov/xdBK3 (last visited June 22, 2021).
111 Id.
112 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., 757 F. App’x
370, 373 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1401).
109
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Act of 1964 are not limited only to hiring, firing, promotions, compensation,
and leave. With any question of statutory interpretation, the Court looks to
the plain language of the statute to derive its intent.113 When discovering a
statute’s intent or when defining undefined terms within the statute, courts
look to the usual and ordinary meaning of the statute’s words.114 The relevant
verbiage in Section 703(a) makes it unlawful for a private employer or a state
or local government “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”115 In
application, courts have condensed this provision to the notion that
employers cannot take “adverse employment actions” because of an
individual’s protected class.116 In interpreting the plain meaning of the “terms
and conditions” of employment, it is difficult to imagine that Congress did
not intend to include the physical conditions of everyday employment such
as the work location, work assignments, rotation between employees, breaks,
and everything else that makes up the day-to-day workplace. The term
“working conditions” is defined as the working environment and all existing
circumstances affecting labor in the workplace, including job hours, physical
aspects, legal rights, and responsibilities.117 It would not make sense for Title
VII’s fundamental goal to be to eradicate all forms of discrimination in the
workplace but not protect against adverse actions as to the most basic
component of the workplace: the physical conditions that employees are
subjected to day in and day out. It cannot be rational to come to the
conclusion that subjecting black employees to work outside, without access
to water, when their white counterparts enjoy bearable working conditions,
does not constitute a term or condition of employment.
When looking to the statutory text of Section 703(a), it is clear that the
term “ultimate employment decision” appears nowhere.118 Rather, it reads
that discrimination as to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
is prohibited.119 The Supreme Court in Meritor held that “the phrase ‘terms,
conditions or privileges of employment’ in Title VII is an expansive concept
which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working
113

See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012); Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62–64 (2006).
115 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2020).
116 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)); see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
117 Working
Condition
Law
and
Legal
Definition,
US
LEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/w/working-condition/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).
118 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2020).
119 Id.
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environment heavily charged with [discrimination].”120 Consequently, to find
that Section 703(a) cannot reach the kinds of discriminatory events that
occurred in Peterson simply does not align with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the statute.121 While Section 703(a) begins by specifying that
employers cannot “fire, or fail or refuse to hire” an individual based on their
race, sex, national origin, color, or religion,122 the text continues to state that
it is unlawful “otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”123 The
text itself clearly indicates that there is something more that makes up the
employment practices Title VII aims to prevent—something beyond a harm
that is easily measured by a financial change.
Today, much of the discrimination that pervades our workplace, and our
society, generally, is unconscious or subconscious. At this point, we cannot
afford to ignore it. Unconscious and subconscious bias, if left unchecked, will
turn into blatant discrimination.124 These biases can manifest themselves in
work evaluations, decision-making, and even career advantages if
preferential treatment is given to only a certain demographic of individuals.
But less obvious are the kinds of subconscious and unconscious bias that the
law is hesitant to regulate because it cannot be measured by numbers or a
paper trail; it is the kind of bias we see in Peterson.125 By rejecting the Fifth
Circuit’s stringent “ultimate employment action” requirement seen in
Peterson, the Supreme Court holds the perfect opportunity to regulate these
subtle forms of discrimination that permeate today’s workplace.
Laws are meant to adapt in order to form a society that protects the rights
of every citizen. To find that a situation in which black employees are forced
to work outside in the summer heat, deprived of air conditioning and water,
while their white counterparts enjoy such luxuries, is not only irresponsible
on behalf of the judiciary, but it is reminiscent of a period of time that simply
did not care about the rights of an entire demographic of people. The
inconsistencies seen throughout the circuits create an unfair and unbalanced
system. A plaintiff who would be able to succeed on a discrimination claim
within the Ninth Circuit126 may not be able to succeed on the same claim by
virtue of bringing the case in the Fifth Circuit.127 While this is true of every
circuit split, the issue we see here is extremely problematic for society.
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
See id.
§ 2000e-2(a).
Id.
See Martinelli, supra note 20.
Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., 757 F. App’x 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2019).
See Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2008).
See, e.g., Peterson, 757 F. App’x at 373.
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Without a holding from the Supreme Court, courts like the Fifth Circuit will
continue deciding cases as if Title VII cannot protect employees from
employers who segregate by subjecting a certain protected class to more
undesirable working conditions if those conditions are not coupled with an
ultimate employment decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
In February of 2019, the Fifth Circuit in Peterson ruled that where black
employees’ job duties were changed to working outside in the Louisiana
summer heat without access to water, while their white counterparts
remained inside in the air conditioning, this did not constitute an adverse
employment action.128 The court reasoned that because the employees did not
suffer an “ultimate employment decision” such as discharge or change in
compensation, their change of duties was not actionable under Title VII.129
Currently, courts remain split on their interpretations of the “adverse
employment action” requirement to establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment. While several courts follow the premise that a wide array of
disadvantageous changes in the workplace can constitute adverse
employment actions,130 other courts, like the Fifth Circuit, strongly disagree,
interpreting Title VII’s substantive prohibition on discrimination to reach
only “ultimate employment decisions.”131 These ultimate employment
decisions encompass only hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or
compensating.132
With discrimination changing its form from the blatant discrimination
Title VII initially was enacted to eradicate, to more subtle and masked forms
of discrimination, the Supreme Court should expand Title VII’s reach to
eliminate discrimination as to the physical conditions of the workplace. The
Supreme Court has previously held that “the phrase ‘terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment’ in Title VII is an expansive concept which sweeps
within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment
heavily charged with discrimination.”133 To hold that only “ultimate
employment decisions” fit squarely within Title VII’s reach is contrary to the
Supreme Court’s own interpretation of the statute.134
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Id.
Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).
See generally Peterson, 757 F. App’x at 373.
McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2007).
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
Id.
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Lastly, the words “ultimate employment decision” appear nowhere in
Section 703.135 The Supreme Court has been clear that limits on the reach of
a statute come from the text of the statute itself, not from “add[ing] words to
the law to produce what is thought to be a desirable result.”136 In fact, limits
on the scope of Section 703 already exist in that the discrimination must be
connected to the workplace, and “merely offensive” conduct alone does not
violate Section 703(a)(1) as that does not sufficiently alter an employee’s job
conditions.137 As a result, rejecting the stringent “ultimate employment
decision” requirement would not open the floodgates to baseless or frivolous
claims, it would simply open the door to plaintiffs with on-the-job racial
segregation claims.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2020).
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 774 (2015).
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